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Abstract | The purpose of this paper is to analyze the direction and background of 
energy policy under the Abe administration, which has achieved a long-term hold on 
power by prioritizing reconstruction of the Japanese economy. Japan encountered an 
opportunity to conduct a major shift in energy policy through the Fukushima nuclear 
accident that occurred following the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. However, the 
Democratic Party of Japan, then the ruling party, failed politically, allowing Abe and the 
Liberal Democratic Party to regain power, and Japan’s energy policy has since been 
characterized by liberalization of the energy market and a return to pre-Fukushima 
nuclear policy. It may be difficult to understand why the Abe administration decided 
on such a nuclear U-turn. It can be concluded that this reflects concerns regarding 
damage to energy and environmental security, political pressure from nuclear host 
communities, and international apprehension over Japan’s accumulating stockpile of 
plutonium. Liberalization of the energy market is leading to fierce competition among 
large corporations, and the Japanese energy market is expected to become more 
dependent on gas and nuclear power for the time being. The paper concludes by 
discussing the implications of these developments for South Korea, which is aiming for 
energy policy transition under Moon Jae-in’s leadership.
Keywords | Abe Shinzō, Japan, energy policy, Liberalization of the energy market, 
restarting nuclear reactors
Introduction
When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regained power in December 2012, 
LDP President Abe Shinzō once again became Japanese prime minister, 
concluding a roughly five-year interlude. In contrast with his rather short first 
tenure (September 2006–September 2007), this time Abe maintained a firm 
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hold over the nation’s affairs for four years before announcing the dissolution of 
the House of Representatives, the lower house in the Diet, on September 25, 
2017, boldly calling for a vote of confidence in him and the LDP. In the House of 
Representatives general election that followed about a month later on October 
22, the commotion over political realignment initiated by Tokyo Governor 
Koike Yuriko’s newly created “Party of Hope” (Kibō no Tō) concluded like a 
tempest in a teapot; the LDP achieved an overwhelming victory as the 
opposition fractured. The LDP alone achieved a majority in the House of 
Representatives, but the LDP-Komeito (Kōmeitō) coalition occupied 284 out of 
the 465 seats, amounting to more than the two-thirds majority needed for 
proposing constitutional amendments. Soon after that, Abe once more assumed 
the position of prime minister on November 1. After about a year, on September 
20, 2018, Abe was re-elected for his third consecutive term as president of the 
ruling LDP. He is likely to be prime minister until September 2021, which will 
surely secure his place among Japan’s “long-term” prime ministers, so rare in the 
postwar era. The best example of which was his great uncle, Satō Eisaku. Elected 
as the sixty-first, sixty-second, and sixty-third prime minister and in power for 
2,798 days, he was the longest serving prime minister in Japan’s post-war history.
In late 2012, when the Abe administration regained power, Japan was in the 
midst of multiple crises: a long-lasting economic recession, demographic decline 
caused by an aging population and low fertility rate, and the recent Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Accident (hereafter Fukushima accident). Abe accordingly 
adopted a policy line markedly different from that of his first tenure. Putting 
aside an emphasis on political ideology, he now advanced economic revival as 
the nation’s primary task, coining the term “Abenomics” (Lim Eunjung 2016a, 
178-80). Abe’s energy policy can also be understood in this context; it was 
composed and pursued in a manner congruent with the emphasis on economic 
revival.
For any nation, energy policy is the key to determining the direction of the 
economy. In Japan, characterized by advanced industry and extreme levels of 
urbanization—as high as 94.3 percent in 2017 (CIA 2018)—government fine-
tuning of energy policy cannot but be tremendously influential in every sector 
of society. Analyzing trends in the energy policy of Japan, which is not only a 
major economic power, but among the highest achievers of economic growth, 
can thus yield lessons for other countries dealing with energy policy in the 
future.
With this purpose in mind, this paper examines the direction of Japan’s 
current energy policy, focusing on the two most apparent changes during the 
era of Abe: liberalization of the energy market and the U-turn to pre-Fukushima 
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nuclear policy. The following section summarizes the Democratic Party of 
Japan’s (DPJ) energy policy that was in effect for approximately three years prior 
to Abe’s return to power, from September 2009 to December 2012. The third 
section analyzes the changes that emerged as liberalization of the electricity and 
gas markets progressed and the dynamics of domestic Japanese politics 
regarding the return to pre-Fukushima nuclear power policy and the restarting 
of nuclear power plants. In particular, since Japan’s nuclear U-turn is difficult to 
comprehend at first glance, analyzing the domestic political and social situation 
in Japan under which this policy was devised allows for consideration of 
potential obstacles to the Japanese government in achieving its policy goals. 
Finally, the last section points out the structural problems hindering the 
transformation of Japanese energy policy and draws out the implications of this 
for other countries.
DPJ Energy Policy
As is well known, the structure of Japanese energy consumption is quite similar 
to that of South Korea (hereafter, Korea). The most appropriate publication to 
examine in order to analyze policy and the conditions of supply and demand in 
the Japanese energy sector is the “Annual Energy Report” (Enerugī ni kansuru 
nenji hōkoku), known as the “Energy White Paper,” published by the Natural 
Resources and Energy Agency (Shigen Enerugīchō) of the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (METI; Keizai Sangyōshō). Additionally, one should consult 
the “Basic Energy Plan”1 that has delineated the fundamental direction of energy 
policy according to the Basic Energy Policy Act passed in June 2002.
In the “2010 Energy White Paper,” the Japanese government compared 
standards of energy security among OECD nations according to the following 
seven criteria: (1) primary energy self-sufficiency rate; (2) diversity of fossil fuel 
imports; (3) dependency risks owing to geopolitical chokepoints; (4) energy 
consumption per GDP unit (indicating the level of shō enerugī)2; (5) responsive 
1. To date, the Japanese government has advanced four successive basic plans: the first in October 
2003, the second in March 2007, the third in June 2010, and the latest in April 2014. As of the 
writing of this paper in January 2018, the fifth such plan was under debate and it was published in 
July 2018. 
2. The term “shō energy” (shō enerugī) is used in Japan to refer to reduction of energy use without 
reducing energy output (production of goods, heating, lighting, street lights, etc.). It corresponds to 
the term “energy efficiency” (enŏji hyoyul) used in Korea. In Japan, shō energy is commonly 
measured in terms of “energy consumption units,” which corresponds to the amount of energy 
used per task. In order to calculate the national shō energy index, encompassing both technical 
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capability regarding oil supply disruption; (6) energy source diversity; and (7) 
power failure time (Shigen Enerugīchō 2010, 67-68).3 The “2010 White Paper” 
published a little over one year into the DPJ administration and before the 
Fukushima accident, although positively evaluating the steady improvement in 
energy self-sufficiency rates in the primary energy sector since the 1980s as a 
result of the consistent pursuit of nuclear power, repeatedly emphasized the lack 
of change in structural constraints owing to the necessity of relying heavily on 
the import of natural resources, since Japan is endowed with few of its own 
(Shigen Enerugīchō 2010, 59-62).
In particular, dependence on Middle Eastern oil could not but pose a 
chronic problem to policymakers. Through continuous effort following the two 
oil crises in the 1970s, Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil certainly 
decreased, but risk associated with dependence on the Middle East and 
geopolitical chokepoints rebounded along with the increasing price of oil in the 
2000s. The government thus turned to natural gas and coal, which were less 
risky than oil in terms of domestic and international politics, in order to 
diversify energy sources. As a result, the Japanese government has been 
evaluated as having improved diversification of energy supply (Shigen 
Enerugīchō 2010, 62). Table 1 compares Japan’s energy security with major 
OECD countries in 2010 with respect to the seven criteria listed above.
As evident in table 1, prior to the Fukushima accident, Japan demonstrated a 
remarkable advantage over other OECD countries in the field of energy 
efficiency (GDP versus energy consumption) and a relatively high score in the 
field of energy source diversity. On the other hand, its primary energy self-
sufficiency rate was quite low, on par with Korea’s. In particular, it manifested a 
decisive structural weakness—subjection to a geopolitical chokepoint—owing to 
its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Accordingly, in 2010, the Japanese 
government committed to improving energy self-sufficiency by promoting 
resource exploitation projects, lowering geopolitical risk by diversifying import 
supply, stabilizing energy supply by reorganizing energy reserves, and other 
energy policy goals (Shigen Enerugīchō 2010, 94).
In the meantime, the DPJ administration also promoted the expansion of 
renewable energy supply. With the Special Measures Act on Electricity 
and structural activity, the “GDP unit” is used (Suehiro 2007, 1-2). In other words, the national shō 
energy index corresponds to energy consumption per GDP unit.
3. In the White Paper, there is a graph integrating all of these criteria known as the “Radar Chart.” 
The OECD average in the 2000s is set at one hundred, with any deviation from this average 
indexed accordingly. For each criterion, the highest-ranking nation is given a score of ten, relative 
to which the other nations are evaluated.
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Providers’ Use of New Energy (Denki jigyōsha ni yoru shin enerugī tō no riyō ni 
kansuru tokubetsu sochihō), announced in June 2002 and implemented in April 
2003, the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) system was initiated to 
promote renewable energy in electricity production. In 2010, to complement the 
RPS system, the DPJ administration partially implemented a renewable energy 
Feed-in Tariff (FIT) system.4 In the “2010 Energy White Paper,” referencing 
examples in Europe, the Japanese government suggested the necessity of 
expanding the FIT system for the rapid development of renewable energy 
(Shigen Enerugīchō 2010, 141-42). On July 1, 2012, it implemented the Special 
Measures Act on Renewable Energy” (Saisei kanō enerugī tokubetsu sochihō), 
introducing a comprehensive FIT system.
However, the Fukushima accident, which occurred along with the Great East 
Japan Earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, curtailed any possibility of 
comprehensively changing Japan’s energy situation. Setting aside even deep 
anxieties over the safety of nuclear power, Japan’s entire system of energy 
supply—electricity, oil, gas, etc.—was disrupted and shaken. In response to this 
4. As supply of solar power sharply declined following the cessation of subsidies supporting solar 
energy production in 2005, while supply rates remained low internationally, the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) pursued the re-implementation of subsidies, and the supply 
rate began a gradual recovery in January 2009. 
Table 1. Evaluation of Japan’s Energy Security in 2010
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Source: Statistics compiled from Shigen Enerugīchō (2010, 89-95).
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situation, an emergency “Energy and Environment Conference” was held on 
July 29 of the same year, and the “Immediate Energy Supply and Demand 
Stabilization Measures” (Tōmen no enerugī jukyū antei saku) were devised to 
minimize damages in the event of extensive stoppages of nuclear power plants. 
Meanwhile, the Fukushima accident had aroused concern for environmental 
compatibility, as reflected in the character of the “2011 Energy White Paper,” 
which asserted the need to establish an energy policy minimizing damage to the 
environment. This document thus sharply contrasted with prevailing energy 
policy, which emphasized economic feasibility and energy security (Shigen 
Enerugīchō 2011).
Amid the process of thoroughly revising energy policy, the DPJ procured 
just fifty-seven of 480 seats in the House of Representatives general election held 
on December 16, 2012, and its time in power came to an end. Meanwhile, the 
LDP achieved an overwhelming victory, securing 294 seats, while the Japan 
Restoration Party (Nihon Yishin no Kai), demonstrating a remarkable advance, 
gained fifty-four, and longstanding LDP coalition partner Komeito, thirty-one. 
The political structure in Japan thus shifted to once again reflect an absolute 
conservative advantage. This major shift could not but obstruct the opportunity 
for the Fukushima accident to act as a “critical juncture,”5 fundamentally 
transforming Japanese energy policy. However, a detailed analysis of the domestic 
political dynamics occasioning the fall of the DPJ and the resurgence of the LDP 
are beyond the scope of this paper.
Liberalization of the Electricity and Gas Markets
One notable transformation in Japan’s energy sector since Abe and the LDP 
regained power has been the complete liberalization of the electricity and gas 
markets. While it would be an exaggeration to claim that this change owes itself 
solely to the Abe administration—liberalization in these two sectors began in 
the 1990s—one can reasonably say that the “third arrow” of Abenomics,6 
“structural reform accompanied by a growth strategy facilitating private 
5. Collier and Collier (2002, 31) classify incidents leading to social change into stages. Although 
the development of a “cleavage” into a “critical juncture” varies by case depending on the precise 
variables and timing, a “critical juncture” generally refers to a period of time facilitating the 
opportunity to transform existing policy and yield a new legacy.
6. The “three arrows” (san-bon no ya) composing Abenomics are: (1) unprecedented quantitative 
easing; (2) dynamic fiscal policy; and (3) structural reform accompanied by a growth strategy 
facilitating private investment.   
 Japan’s Energy Policy under Abe  109
investment,” has increased the pace of this liberalization.
The Japanese government points out the following changes to the electricity 
and gas markets expected in the near to distant future (Shigen Enerugīchō 
2016b, 2). First, stagnating demand for electricity and gas resulting from the 
demographic decline of an aging population with a low fertility rate may lead to 
general economic decline encompassing the electric power and gas industries. 
Second, potential growth factors can be expected to develop as technological 
innovation (e.g. Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence) leads to new services 
or as new domestic markets are born out of global marketization and 
liberalization. Third, the very structure of value creation in the electricity and 
gas markets may change according to decentralization, liberalization, and 
technological innovation. Therefore, one may infer that the current Japanese 
government views liberalization of the electricity and gas markets as a means of 
stimulating private investment and creating new engines of growth. Considering 
this outlook, the following sub-sections examine the process of liberalizing the 
Japanese electricity and gas markets and how it has changed in the Abe era.
1. Electricity Market Liberalization
Liberalization of the electric power sector began with reforms in April 1996. The 
reforms expanded competition by allowing Independent Power Producers 
(IPP), which supplied power to electric power companies, to participate in the 
retail market. A second reform in March 2003 partially opened the retail market 
to “special high voltage users,”—such as factories, department stores, and office 
buildings—which consumed more than 20kV, or 2,000kW, of electricity. This 
meant the opening of the electricity grid previously monopolized by General 
Electric Utilities (GEU) to Power Producers and Suppliers (PPS). Through a 
third round of reform beginning in April 2003, the Electricity Enterprises Act 
was revised, establishing the Japan Electricity Power Exchange (JEPX), and in 
April 2004, the electricity grid was opened to high voltage users consuming as 
little as 500kW, a figure further reduced to 50kW in April 2005. A fourth round 
of reform in April 2008 aimed at invigorating the wholesale market and 
improving the conditions of competition. However, despite introducing 
competition to the power generation sector and the principles of market 
competition to the retail sector through partial liberalization, the existing GEU 
monopoly structure underwent little substantive change (Han’guk Chŏllyŏk 
Kŏraeso 2015, 10-13).
Amid such conditions, not only did the Fukushima accident provoke a shift 
in Japanese perceptions, but also a decidedly different environment for electric 
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power companies as nuclear power plants shut down. Abe’s return to power led 
to another three rounds of amendment to the Electricity Business Act,7 and 
complete liberalization was implemented in April 2017, allowing ordinary 
households to purchase electricity from IPPs. Thus, the electricity market—
worth eight trillion yen in electricity and supplied exclusively by GEUs—was 
transformed into a competitive system. Currently there are plans to legally 
separate the transmission and distribution sectors from the power generation 
sector in April 2020.
Despite complete liberalization, one can still observe the prominence of 
major companies. As of February 2017, less than a year after liberalization, five 
companies accounted for about seventy percent of new operators’ total 
electricity supply (2,664 million kWh): Tokyo Gas (Tōkyō Gasu), Osaka Gas 
(Ōsaka Gasu), JX Nippon Oil & Energy (JX Nikkō Nisseki Enerugī), KDDI, and 
Jupiter Telecom (Jupitā Terekomu, J:COM) (Im Chi-yŏng 2017, 18). Moreover, 
the Japanese government fully expects the linking of different sectors and the 
evolution of energy companies into companies that can provide more 
comprehensive energy services to continue (Shigen Enerugīchō 2016b, 32-36). 
Meanwhile, the number of new companies has steadily increased; as of January 
2018, there were 450 registered retail electricity providers.8 The evident increase 
in community-based operators9 offering a range of fare systems and services in 
connection with local governments is thus especially remarkable (Shigen 
Enerugīchō 2016b, 26).
However, it is necessary to observe the degree to which consumers have 
changed energy providers since the retail electricity market underwent complete 
liberalization. According to a survey conducted in September 2016, the number 
of respondents stating they “might change energy providers within the next 
sixth months” had decreased slightly from the previous year. Moreover, the 
proportion of respondents stating they were “not really considering changing” 
was the same, hovering just above forty percent. Reasons for this were mainly 
“not knowing the benefits of changing” and being “used to the current provider” 
7. The first amendment was passed in November 2013 (Law no. 74), the second in June 2014 (Law 
no. 72), and the third in June 2015 (Law no. 17).
8. The business registry can be found on the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy homepage. 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/electricity_and_gas/electric/summary/retailers_list. 
Accessed January 15, 2018.
9. METI divides companies into four categories based on service area scope: (1) national operators 
(exceeding four regions); (2) mid-size operators (two to three regions); (3) limited area operators 
(one region); and community-based operators (single metropolis [to], circuit [dō], urban prefecture 
[fu], or prefecture [ken]).
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(Shigen Enerugīchō 2017b, 27-28). It has also been suggested that only a very 
small segment of consumers will change providers following liberalization (Im 
Chi-yŏng 2016, 30).
Considering such skepticism, changes that occurred in 2017 are worth 
noting. In September 2017, 4.59 million instances (7.3 percent of consumers) of 
“switching” (suitchingu) service providers were recorded in the low-voltage 
sector across Japan.10 Instances of changing a contract with an existing GEU were 
recorded at 3.13 million (five percent of consumers). Altogether, 12.3 percent of 
low-voltage consumers changed providers (Shigen Enerugīchō 2017f, 1). 
Considering that these rates were at 3.9 and 3.8 percent, respectively, in January 
2017 (Shigen Enerugīchō 2017b, 2), it looks as if switching occurred at quite a 
rapid pace. As a result, the market share of new electrical companies is rapidly 
expanding (Shigen Enerugīchō 2017f, 2-3).
2. Gas Market Liberalization
Liberalization of the gas sector began in 1995, a year earlier than the electricity 
sector. The gas sector is naturally favorable to monopolization, even more so 
than the electricity sector. Gas supply to ordinary households, for example, is 
inevitably accompanied by conduit maintenance and inspection services. 
Furthermore, the prohibitive costs of fuel procurement restrict the entry of new 
companies into the sector. Moreover, in Japan, the city gas business developed 
under a regional monopolistic structure focusing on urban centers where 
energy demand is high. With liberalization, however, a trend toward the gradual 
enlargement of companies supplying large-scale rural gas demand has emerged 
(Im Chi-yŏng 2016, 19-21).
A first round of reform amended the Gas Business Act in June 1995, 
initiating liberalization of the market for contracts corresponding to two million 
cubic meters or more of annual supply. Through a second round of reforms in 
1999, rate cutting changed from an authorization to a reporting system and 
liberalization expanded to encompass the market for contracts corresponding to 
one million cubic meters or more of annual supply. A third round of reform 
reduced this figure to just 500,000 cubic meters. The retail gas market thus 
10. The number of contracts in the low-voltage sector totaled about eighty-six million in March 
2016, but the figure above excludes the likes of previous optional condition and public street-
lighting contracts, where switching would be quite difficult. As of March 2016, ordinary contracts, 
including general household contracts, totaled about 62,530,000. Additionally, one should be 
careful of counting multiple cases of switching when consumers repeatedly change supplier or 
between free- or fixed-rate GEU contracts.
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underwent piecemeal liberalization whereby the regional monopolies of regular 
gas suppliers gradually disappeared. In April 2017, the retail gas market was 
completely liberalized together with the retail electricity market, allowing new 
operators to supply gas to households alongside general gas providers. In other 
words, the retail pricing system was abolished in principle, although transitional 
measures such as regulated fee options were still required in areas where 
competition was inadequate to protect consumers. The creation of a separate 
conduit sector is planned for April 2022.
Retail liberalization opened a gas market worth roughly 2.4 trillion yen and 
consisting of an estimated 26 million consumers in the form of ordinary 
households, shops, offices, etc. Together with the previously liberalized large-
scale consumption sector, a gas market valued at approximately five trillion yen 
was now open to competition. The Japanese government expects this will save 
money and improve convenience for consumers (Shigen Enerugīchō 2017e, 14). 
Meanwhile, the number of new operators is increasing, especially in the Kantō 
region. And just like the electricity sector, switching underwent a remarkable 
increase in 2017. Between March and November 2017, about 544,000 instances 
of switching were recorded nationwide, focused mainly in the Kinki region 
(Shigen Enerugīchō 2017g, 2). In addition, gas companies have been working to 
provide local services in connection with local governments (Shigen Enerugīchō 
2017b, 26).
3. Outlook
While it is still too early to evaluate the liberalization of the retail electricity and 
gas markets, it is possible to tentatively describe the trajectory of this process. 
Above all else, the Abe administration planned for complete liberalization of the 
electricity and gas markets to decrease infrastructural service fees and stabilize 
the energy supply. In this respect, the first point that should be considered is the 
continuous rise in electricity fees since the Fukushima disaster. Japan’s electricity 
rates underwent a drastic increase in the 1970s amid the two oil shocks before 
gradually declining in the 1990s; a simple comparison between 1994 and 2007 
reveals a twenty percent decline. Since the Fukushima accident, however, the 
shutdown of all nuclear reactors and the increasing dependence on imported 
fossil fuels has led to a steady increase in electricity rates. In 2010, prior to the 
Fukushima accident, the energy rate (combined electricity and public lighting 
rate) was about sixteen yen per kWh, but in 2013, two years after the Fukushima 
accident, it had increased to around twenty yen (Shigen Enerugīchō 2014a, 11). 
Increasing electricity rates have not only burdened the average consumer, but 
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also obstructed the Abe administration’s efforts to promote economic revival 
through the development of new industries and private economic activity.
With electricity fees becoming ever more burdensome, the issue of how 
complete liberalization of the electricity and gas markets might transform the 
relationship between existing electricity and gas providers has gained much 
attention. At the moment, it looks as if competition will only intensify, as 
attested to by the fact that electricity and gas providers have competed over rates 
integrating electricity and gas services. For example, in December 2016, Kansai 
Electric Power Company (Kansai Denryoku) announced a rate for households 
consuming thirty-three cubic meters of gas per month that was up to eight 
percent cheaper than Osaka Gas’ regular rate. In response, Osaka Gas announced 
a rate in January 2017 as much as 7.5 percent cheaper than the regular rate for 
combined gas and electricity contracts. Kansai Electric Power then immediately 
announced a new fare plan up to thirteen percent cheaper than Osaka Gas’ 
regular rate (Im Chi-yŏng 2017, 25). Such competition has been advantageous 
for consumers in terms of rationalizing prices and widening the range of choice. 
However, intensifying competition between major companies casts doubt on the 
potential of relatively smaller companies. If small and medium-size companies 
fail and only large-scale companies are left, the Japanese energy sector may not 
end up looking all that different than it did prior to liberalization.
In conclusion, one can assume that Japan will continues its absolute 
dependence on gas while accelerating the restarting of halted nuclear reactors in 
the near future. Large-scale energy providers naturally prefer cost-effective fossil 
fuels to renewable energy, and gas will hold certain advantages over coal in 
terms of energy and environmental protection. Meanwhile, large-scale power 
companies equipped with nuclear power plants naturally prefer to restart the 
plants.
This outlook is reflected in the targets listed in the “Long-term Energy 
Supply and Demand Outlook” (Chōki enerugī jukyū mitōshi) published in 2015 
(Keizai Sangyōshō 2015), in which the government reaffirmed its energy 
position through the “3E+S”11 policy. The government proposed to reduce 
energy consumption through energy efficiency by 50.3 million kl by 2030 even 
while maintaining an economic growth rate of 1.7 percent per annum. It set the 
supply of primary energy at 4.89 million kl in 2030, thirty percent of which is to 
be supplied by oil, twenty-five percent by coal, eighteen percent by natural gas, 
three percent by liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), ten to eleven percent by nuclear 
11. “3E+S” indicates the values underpinning the Japanese Basic Energy Plan. The three “E’s” are 
Energy Security, Economic Efficiency, and Environment, while the “S” stands for Safety.
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power, and thirteen to fourteen percent by renewable energy. These targets 
reflect the aim to raise the rate of domestically produced energy, so greatly 
damaged by the Fukushima accident, to twenty-four percent. In terms of 
electricity, the following targets have been set: twenty-seven percent liquefied 
natural gas (LNG); twenty-six percent coal; twenty to twenty-two percent 
nuclear power; twenty-two to twenty-four percent renewable energy; and three 
percent coal (Keizai Sangyōshō 2015, 2-7). 
The importance of nuclear power and gas for Japan’s energy supply is thus 
clear. The establishment of this fact is an important prerequisite for the 
following section, which analyzes the background against which the Abe 
administration initiated a return to the pre-Fukushima nuclear policy.
Abe’s Return and the Nuclear U-turn
Following the Fukushima accident, the DPJ administration adopted a critical 
policy position toward nuclear power, ordering the cessation of all nuclear 
reactors across Japan. In a July 2011 press conference, Prime Minister Kan Naoto 
stated, “I have come to believe that our society must overcome its dependence 
on nuclear power” (Shushō Kantei 2011). At the Energy and Environment 
Conference in September 2012, his successor Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko 
announced the “Innovative Energy and Environmental Strategy” (Kakushin-teki 
enerugī-kankyō senryaku), which espoused the goal of “zero nuclear power” 
(Shushō Kantei 2012). Ultimately, this plan met with political opposition and 
failed to reach the level of cabinet decision.
The Fukushima accident was a terrible tragedy, but it also served as an 
opportunity for Japan to examine and revise its energy policy. Initiating just 
such a process, the incumbent DPJ administration promoted a policy that 
would reduce dependence on nuclear power as much as possible. However, this 
policy failed to gain momentum, and any long-term prospects of abandoning 
nuclear power disappeared altogether when the DPJ was defeated in the 2012 
House of Representatives general election.
1. Negative Perceptions of Nuclear Power
To the degree that the Fukushima accident was a crisis demanding comprehensive 
revision of Japanese energy policy, it was clearly what Collier and Collier (2002, 
31) refer to as a “cleavage.” In a 2007 Asahi Shimbun survey regarding the use of 
nuclear power, thirteen percent of respondents advocated expansion, fifth-three 
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percent the status quo, twenty-one percent reduction, and seven percent 
abandonment. However, in April 2011, one month after the Fukushima accident, 
five percent advocated expansion, fifty-one percent the status quo, thirty 
percent reduction, and eleven percent abandonment (“Genpatsu ‘herasu-
yameru’ 41%,” 2011). Thus, the number of those supporting reduction or 
abandonment of nuclear power increased by as much as ten percent after the 
Fukushima accident. Furthermore, on July 16, 2012, before the Abe adminis- 
tration’s return to power, an association opposed to the use of nuclear power 
known as the “Goodbye Nuclear Power Hundred Thousand People Rally” 
(Sayōnara genpatsu 10-man nin shūkai) occupied Yoyogi Park in Tokyo. 
According to the organizers, about 170,000 people participated in the rally 
(“Datsu genpatsu ‘10-man nin shūkai,’” 2012). Demonstrations of this size have 
been extremely rare in post-war Japan since the campaign against the Japan–US 
Security Treaty (Anpo tōsō) in 1960.
What is even more remarkable is that a considerable number of Japanese 
citizens came to espouse a negative view of nuclear power after the Fukushima 
accident despite rising electricity rates exacerbating the burdensome cost of 
daily living. Such negative perspectives can be confirmed through various 
sources. In particular, opinion polls demonstrated consistently high levels of 
opposition to restarting nuclear power, regardless of the political orientation of 
the surveying institution (Kitada 2015, 31). Moreover, such opposition remained 
consistent even after the Abe administration returned to power and began to 
pursue the reactivation of nuclear power. In a March 2017 Mainichi Shimbun 
survey, fifty-five percent of respondents opposed nuclear power, far surpassing 
the twenty-six percent who supported it. This disparity was even greater than 
that of a 2016 survey, which saw opposition at fifty-three percent and support at 
thirty percent (“Honsha seron chōsa,” 2017).
Meanwhile, according to surveys periodically conducted by the Japan 
Atomic Energy Relations Organization (Nihon Genshiryoku Bunka Zaidan), 
forty-five percent of the Japanese people supported gradual abandonment of 
nuclear power and sixteen percent immediate abandonment (see table 2). 
Considering this general opposition to the use of nuclear power, one cannot but 
view the Abe administration’s efforts to restart the nuclear reactors as quite 
puzzling. The explanation for this requires examination of a number of factors, 
as follows.
2. Conventional Wisdom about the Benefits of Nuclear Power
The following two features are typically cited as benefits of nuclear power. First, 
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to the degree that it is evaluated as a “base load” energy source, nuclear power is 
considered to be superior in terms of energy supply stability. Second, nuclear 
power generation produces low greenhouse gas emissions compared even with 
renewable energy, not to mention fossil fuels. The term “base load” refers to the 
minimum amount of energy supply needed, regardless of the time of day. It can 
be understood in contrast with “peak load,” which describes when energy 
demands tend to be at their highest. Unlike with renewable energy, the 
production of which can vary depending on the weather or time of day, the 
greatest benefit of nuclear power is that it produces a set amount of energy 
regardless of external conditions twenty-four hours a day. This is especially 
advantageous for a nation such as Japan, which is highly industrialized, highly 
urbanized, and dependent on modern facilities. Furthermore, since Japan is not 
connected to a wide-area grid linking multiple nations—a so-called “super 
grid”—securing a stable base load cannot but be considered an issue of national 
security. The inability of renewable energy to provide a secure base load is its 
greatest shortcoming.
During the twenty-three month-long “nuclear zero” period12 in which the 
12. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japan began the sequential halt of all nuclear power 
plants. With the halt of the Fukui-4 reactor on September 16, 2013, Japan reached a state of 
“nuclear zero.” This condition came to an end twenty-three months later with the restarting of the 
Sendai-1 reactor in August 2015.
Table 2. Responses to the Question, “How Should Japan Make Use of Nuclear Power 







Increase use 1.3 1.7 1.8
Maintain situation prior to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake
8.8 10.1 8.3
Use for time being but gradual phase-out 47.8 47.9 45.2
Use immediately stopped 16.2 14.8 16.9
Other 1.9 1 1
Not sure 20.6 22.9 23.7
Irrelevant answers 3.5 1.7 3.2
Source: Nihon Genshiryoku Bunka Zaidan (2017, 76).
Note: Each sample consisted of 1,200 respondents.
 Japan’s Energy Policy under Abe  117
operations of all nuclear power were completely stopped, even while struggling 
to reduce energy use, Japan maximized coal-fired power generation and 
increased the use of natural gas power generation in order to retain its energy 
capacity and secure a base load. However, the more Japan becomes dependent 
on fossil fuels, the more it becomes dependent on energy imports, undermining 
energy security. Meanwhile, problems of climate change are exacerbated as fossil 
fuel emissions increase. In the Fourth Basic Energy Plan, the Japanese 
government designated drains on national wealth, damages to energy security, 
and surges in greenhouse gas emissions due to the increased import of fossil 
fuels as the most serious problems since the Fukushima accident (Shigen 
Enerugīchō 2014b).





2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018
Domestic supply of 
primary energy (Mtoe)
513.5 472.9 465.5 463.5 466.7 465.3 -0.4% 0.7% -0.3%
Coal 119.2 124.4 123.7 121.9 122.5 122.6 -1.5% 0.5% 0.1%
Oil 212.0 198.6 193.3 187.6 185.1 178.5 -3.0% -1.3% -3.6%
Natural gas 95.7 118.9 113.0 114.7 114.8 110.5 1.5% 0.1% -3.8%
LNG imports (Mt) 70.6 89.1 83.6 84.7 82.8 81.0 1.4% -2.3% -2.2%
Hydro power 17.2 17.1 17.7 16.3 16.7 16.9 -7.7% 2.3% 1.3%
Nuclear power 60.7 0.0 2.0 3.7 6.7 14.0 91.3% 78.6% 109%
Renewable energy 8.9 13.9 15.8 19.3 21.0 22.8 22.1% 8.4% 8.7%
Self-sufficiency rate 17.8% 7.5% 8.5% 9.4% 10.7% 12.7% 0.9p 1.3p 2.0p
Energy consumption 
per GDP unit 
(FY2011=100)
105.2 93.4 90.7 89.2 88.3 87.0 -1.6% -1.1% -1.4%
CO2 emissions per 
energy source (Mt-CO2)
1,131 1,186 1,150 1,144 1,132 1,104 -0.5% -1.0% -2.5%
Source: Table 4 in Aoshima et al. (2017). 
Note 1: All years are based on fiscal year.
Note 2: Renewable energies include wind power, solar power, solar heat, and biomass.
Note 3: Shaded boxes show expected figures.
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Table 3 displays current trends and future prospects for Japan’s primary 
energy supply. One can observe that nuclear power generation has gradually 
increased since Abe’s return to power and the lifting of the “nuclear zero” 
condition in August 2015. The effect on primary sources of energy, coal, and gas 
as nuclear power plants began to resume operations is also clear (Aoshima et al. 
2017). If the use of nuclear power is fully resumed and the use of renewable 
energy increases, one can expect energy consumption per GDP unit and self-
sufficiency figures to improve and carbon dioxide emissions to steadily decrease 
(Aoshima et al. 2017). From the perspective of the Japanese government, 
considering concern with the vulnerability of Japan’s energy security and 
environmental issues, this outlook cannot but be evaluated positively.
However, since the benefits of nuclear power discussed thus far do not apply 
only to Japan, they are not sufficient to explain the Abe administration’s policy 
to restart the nuclear power plants. Germany, for example, a highly industrialized 
society endowed with national and economic power on par with Japan’s, has 
been working to reduce nuclear power since the Fukushima accident. The 
German government decided to shut down eight reactors built before 1980 and 
its remaining nine reactors by 2022. Meanwhile, it has consistently increased the 
use of renewable energy; as of 2015, thirty percent of power in Germany was 
generated through renewable sources of energy (Energy Information 
Administration 2016). Accordingly, in order to understand the background 
against which the Abe administration opted for a return to nuclear energy, a 
more thorough discussion of Japan’s domestic circumstances is required.
The Politics of the Nuclear U-turn
As previously mentioned, rather than clinging to an ideological identity as he 
had in his first term, Abe initiated his successful return to power by focusing on 
economic revival. In the area of energy policy, considering the Abe 
administration’s pursuit of energy conservation and renewable energy, it did not 
look very different from the preceding DPJ administration. Nevertheless, the 
Abe administration gradually advanced the restarting of halted nuclear reactors, 
signifying a return to Japan’s pre-Fukushima nuclear policy.
The Abe administration faced criticism both at home (“Genpatsu, towareru 
saikadō,” 2017) and abroad (Shaun 2014) for ostensibly ignoring the lessons of 
the Fukushima accident. There were even those among the Korean media 
suspicious of whether Japan’s return to nuclear energy reflected a desire to 
develop nuclear weapons (“Il wŏnjŏn chaegadong,” 2015). Rather than such 
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ideologically charged criticism, however, a more fruitful analysis should take 
into account the precise costs and benefits the Abe administration had to 
consider in turning to nuclear power for Japan’s energy needs.
1. The Conservatism of Nuclear Host Communities
Ultimately, in order to understand the nuclear U-turn policy from the 
perspective of the Abe administration, rather than public opinion at the national 
level, there is a need to investigate the opinions of those residing in regions 
where nuclear power plants are located and the relationship between these 
regions and the central government. Excepting Fukushima Prefecture, looking 
at the results of the last three sets of local elections with respect to the nineteen 
local governments presiding over nuclear host communities, transfers of power 
have occurred only twice since the Fukushima disaster: in the town of Onagawa, 
Miyagi prefecture and Tōkai village, Ibaraki prefecture. In the remaining areas, 
all existing local authorities were re-elected (Senkyo Dotto Komu).
One can infer the conservatism of nuclear host communities from these 
results. Of course, nuclear power is not the only issue of concern for these 
voters, but considering their unique circumstances and the temporal proximity 
with the Fukushima accident, it does not seem unreasonable to consider the 
re-election of every local authority except for two an index of their conservatism. 
Even in the case of Rokkasho village, the newly elected Village Mayor Toda 
Mamoru was the handpicked successor of former village mayor Furukawa 
Kenji.13 Although it does not have a nuclear power plant itself, Rokkasho village 
is deeply involved in the nuclear power industry through its nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities, including a reprocessing plant, enrichment plant, and medium- and 
low-level radioactive waste repository.
Ultimately, despite the Fukushima accident, the majority of Japan’s nuclear 
host communities did not come to oppose nuclear power. Rather, these residents 
have tentatively or actively supported a return to pre-Fukushima nuclear policy 
and the restarting of nuclear power plants. Kainuma (2011) reveals the history 
of nuclear host communities and points out that regions like Fukushima have 
actively sought out nuclear power. He refers to the localities that align with 
special interests to procure nuclear facilities as “nuclear villages” (genshiryoku 
13. Furukawa is the younger brother of Furukawa Isematsu, four-time mayor of Rokkasho village 
from 1973 to 1989. The Furukawa brothers were the most active local leaders in the procurement 
of nuclear power-related facilities. The author visited Rokkasho village in September 2012 to 
interview Village Mayor Furukawa Kenji.
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mura).14 This image of “nuclear villages” is reaffirmed in a 2013 Asahi Shimbun 
survey conducted following Abe’s return to power, which had as its subjects 155 
local representatives, including mayors from 134 cities, towns, and villages and 
governors from one “circuit” (Hokkaido) and twenty urban prefectures (fu) and 
prefectures (ken), within a thirty-kilometer radius of Japan’s sixteen commercial 
reactors, excluding those currently under construction and the already closed 
Fukushima plant.15 The majority of local government authorities in regions 
adjacent to nuclear host communities expressed negative or neutral views 
regarding reactivation, whereas local government representatives within nuclear 
host communities generally expressed neutral or positive views (“Genpatsu 
30-kiro ken,” 2013).
This phenomenon, not easily understood at first glance, can be explained in 
terms of two factors. First, the financial contributions of the nuclear power 
industry to nuclear host communities were significant. In 1974, under Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei, the so-called “Three Nuclear Power Acts”—Organization 
of Areas Adjacent to Power Generation Facilities Act, Energy Development Tax 
Promotion Act, and Special Accounting Act for Energy Development Promotion 
Measures—were passed to facilitate the installation of power generation 
facilities, laying down the legal basis for improving the welfare and finances of 
areas in which power plants were located. Examining the financial situation of 
twenty-one local governments (six cities and fifteen towns and villages) 
presiding over nuclear host communities, Koike (2013, 6-7) found that local 
power base grants and local taxes (especially fixed asset taxes) formed the basis 
of revenue, particularly for the towns and villages, indicating the financial 
character of these regions. Furthermore, in the cases of Fukui, Fukushima, 
Ehime, Saga, Shimane, Shizuoka, Kagoshima, Miyagi, Niigata, and Ishikawa 
prefectures and Hokkaido, which imposed a nuclear fuel tax, the halting of 
nuclear power plants actually caused considerable harm to tax revenue (Koike 
2013, 5).
Second, there is the high dependence of the industrial structure of nuclear 
host communities on the nuclear power industry. While average income is 
14. Originally, “nuclear village” was a pejorative term criticizing the exclusivity and corruption 
characterizing the “village” (mura) society of industry, the government, and academia, which had 
supported the development of nuclear power in Japan. However, in his use of the term “nuclear 
village,” Kainuma (2011) transcribed “village” using Katakana rather than Kanji (Chinese 
charcters). For an analysis of the political and economic background of Fukushima’s attainment of 
a nuclear power plant see Lim Eunjung (2014).
15. The survey was implemented from January to mid-February 2013 by sending questionnaires to 
the 155 local government representatives. 
 Japan’s Energy Policy under Abe  121
higher in nuclear host communities than the national average, there are many 
involved in tertiary industries related to the energy supply industry. This 
phenomenon is even more pronounced in rural than in urbanized areas (Koike 
2013, 7). Consequently, if nuclear facilities do not resume normal operations, 
one can expect major social impacts as local tax revenue decreases and economic 
activity stagnates.
Accordingly, despite general and politicized opposition to the reactivation of 
nuclear power, the Abe administration is more likely to evaluate the issue in 
terms of cost and gain, considering the financial harm to nuclear host com- 
munities, rural economic stagnation, and the resulting social problems.
2. Accumulating Plutonium Stocks
The final factor involved in the Abe administration’s U-turn to pre-Fukushima 
nuclear policy concerns contradictions pertaining to Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle 
policy. Gaining the right to engage in fuel concentration and reprocessing 
through revision of the US-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1988, 
Japan began to reprocess spent fuel in France and England,16 and its plutonium 
stocks have steadily increased since then. As of 2016, Japan’s stock of plutonium 
domestically and abroad reached 46.9 tons (Naikakufu Genshiryoku Tantōshitsu 
2017, 1). This accumulation of plutonium, a level unmatched among non-
nuclear weapons states that is only increasing, has drawn the ire of the 
international community.
Japan’s original plan pertaining to its nuclear fuel cycle policy was for 
continual reuse of spent fuel through fast-breeding reactors (FBR). Despite 
astronomic investment in the sodium-cooled “Monju” reactor, however, desired 
performance was not achieved, and in the 1990s, Japan adopted the next-best 
“plu-thermal” method, which burned mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing 
reactors.17 Ultimately, Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy came to rest on three 
16. Opinions differ even among nuclear engineers regarding reprocessing. Professor Frank von 
Hippel of Princeton and former Japan Atomic Energy Commission vice president Dr. Suzuki 
Tatsujirō are quite well known, even in Korea, as being opposed to reprocessing. The primary 
reason for their opposition is that reprocessing produces plutonium, a raw material for nuclear 
weapons. This is also the basic policy of the US. Espousing “non-proliferation,” it has argued for an 
“open fuel cycle” (also referred to as “once-through” and “direct disposal”) instead of reprocessing 
with respect to spent fuel. Meanwhile, those who support reprocessing note that it reduces the 
absolute volume of radioactive waste and that reusing plutonium helps with energy conservation. 
South Korea is currently developing a technique known as pyro-processing in cooperation with 
the US to “recycle” (intentionally avoiding use of the term “reprocessing”) spent fuel.
17. The term “plu-thermal” combines the words “plutonium” and “thermal neutron reactor.” It 
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pillars: (1) nuclear power generation, (2) reprocessing of spent fuel, and (3) the 
plu-thermal method. These components of the fuel cycle are so dependent on 
each other that if any one fails, so will the other two. For this reason, they have 
been referred to as a “trinity” (Lim Eunjung 2016b).
Following the Fukushima accident, however, as nuclear power generation 
halted, the industry began to face new and even more complex problems. Lim 
(2016b) points out three contradictions in Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy since 
the Fukushima accident that constitute Japan’s “nuclear trilemma.” The first 
contradiction is related to the fact that promoting reprocessing without 
consuming existing plutonium stockpile through restarting nuclear power 
plants cannot attain legitimacy at home or abroad because reprocessing alone 
will only add more plutonium to Japan’s already extensive plutonium stockpile. 
Second, as long as reprocessing facilities are not operational, promoting only the 
restarting of nuclear power plants will cause spent fuel rods to accumulate. 
Finally, engaging only in reprocessing without restarting nuclear power plants 
using MOX fuel will result in further accumulation of plutonium.
Faced with these threefold contradictions, Abe has responded by reviving 
traditional nuclear policy. Japan’s nuclear U-turn can thus be explained in terms 
of the pronounced difficulty involved in securing alternative sources of energy 
to nuclear power, rather than the weakly supported conspiracy theory that 
Japan continues to harbor “nuclear ambitions.” For example, under DPJ rule, the 
Japan Atomic Energy Commission recommended that reprocessing of spent 
fuel be stopped as soon as possible due to prohibitive costs. More recently, to the 
degree which reprocessing has been erroneously thought of as an alternative as 
long as intermediate storage facilities in Japan are lacking, the commission also 
concluded that final repositories must be established as soon as possible 
(Naikakufu Genshiryoku Tantōshitsu 2012, 17). However, this attitude of the 
central government met with immediate opposition from Rokkasho village. As 
Mayor Furukawa stated, “I’m aware of the criticism regarding the nuclear fuel 
cycle policy, but it will be very troublesome to cancel the original plan now.” 
Pointing out that “the construction of the reprocessing facility, which is the 
heart of the business, is ninety-nine percent complete,” he asserted that 
“adhering to nuclear fuel policy is the right thing to do” (“‘Tokuhō’ ‘Fukushima’ 
go,” 2012). Owing to this disagreement between the central and local 
governments, the DPJ administration, which wished to follow through on the 
recommendations of the commission, ultimately gave up its plan to stop 
refers to a method of burning MOX fuel mixed with plutonium in a conventional pressurized light 
water reactor.
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reprocessing at a cabinet meeting in September 2012.
Among the obstacles the central government faced was the commitment by 
successive administrations to Aomori prefecture—where Rokkasho village is 
located—that the region would never be used as a final repository site in 
exchange for the construction of reprocessing facilities (“Kaku no gomi,” 2017).18 
Since Rokkasho village may effectively become an intermediary or final 
repository site if the reprocessing facility does not resume operations as planned, 
it has thus remained a staunch supporter of the plan to restart nuclear power 
plants. With no breakthrough in sight regarding nuclear energy policy, the Abe 
administration ultimately revived the pre-Fukushima nuclear policy upon 
returning to power. Considering the three contradictions of nuclear policy 
outlined above, however, if Japan maintains this direction it will continue to face 
the issue of increasing plutonium stocks (Acton 2015; Lim Eunjung 2016b). As 
plutonium stocks increase, moreover, Japan may become the subject of ever 
more international criticism not only from suspicious neighboring countries, 
but also its ally the US, which advocates direct disposal (Iwata 2015).
In conclusion, a considerable number of Japanese people have opposed the 
restarting of nuclear reactors despite the substantial burden of rising electricity 
rates. Nonetheless, the Abe regime has moved toward reinstating the pre-
Fukushima nuclear policy under pressure from multiple directions. These 
include security and environmental issues (i.e. impact on energy security and 
increasing greenhouse gas emissions), the changes in the electricity market due 
to the fierce competition engendered by liberalization, political pressure from 
the financial deterioration of nuclear host communities, and domestic and 
international criticism pertaining to increasing plutonium stocks.
As of August 2018, nine nuclear reactors are operational in Japan, including 
Shikoku Electric Power Company’s (Shikoku Denryoku) Itaka-3 reactor,19 
Kyushu Electric Power Company’s (Kyūshū Denryoku) Sendai-1, Sendai-2, 
Genkai-3, and Genkai-4 reactors, and Kansai Electric Power Company’s (Kansai 
Denryoku) Takahama-3, Takahama-4, Ohi-3, and Ohi-4 reactors.20 Considering 
the complexity and laboriousness of the evaluative process and various political 
18. In the case of Hokkaido, an ordinance preemptively negated the possibility of becoming a final 
repository.
19. For example, residents of Hiroshima and Ehime prefectures requested an injunction against the 
restarting of Shikoku Electric Power Company’s (Shikoku Denryoku) Ikata-3 reactor in Ehime 
prefecture. The Hiroshima District Court dismissed this injunction in March 2017, but the 
Hiroshima Court of Appeals overturned this ruling in December of the same year.
20. Visit the Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (Genshiryoku Anzen Suishin Kyōkai) website for more 
details regarding reactivation. http://www.genanshin.jp/english/facility/map/.
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hurdles, it looks as if the restarting process will continue at a gradual pace. 
However, for reasons examined in this paper, one can certainly expect the 
degree of Japan’s dependence on nuclear power to increase for the foreseeable 
future.
Conclusion
Through the Fukushima accident, Japan had an opportunity to pursue a major 
change in energy governance. However, following Abe’s return to power roughly 
a year and a half later, the most conspicuous changes in Japanese energy policy 
involved complete liberalization of the electricity and gas markets and a U-turn 
to pre-Fukushima nuclear policies. There has thus been very little reform of 
energy governance. This paper analyzed the direction of Japanese energy policy 
following Abe’s return to power and the domestic circumstances shaping it. In 
this closing section, rather than a conclusion, the paper provides a brief discussion 
of the structural limitations of Japan’s energy governance implicated in this 
policy change and how they compare with those of other countries.
First, one can sense the conflict between liberalization of the electricity and 
gas markets and the pursuit of environmental security. Still in its initial stages, 
the fruits of the liberalization of Japan’s energy market will only reveal 
themselves with time. However, as mentioned above, market liberalization has 
operated in the service of major companies tending toward cost-efficient energy 
sources that are relatively low emitters of carbon dioxide, such as natural gas 
and nuclear power, not renewable energy. But it is difficult to claim that gas is 
positively contributing to energy security. Not only is it a fossil fuel that emits 
greenhouse gases, it is also dependent on foreign imports. Meanwhile, the 
return to nuclear power is a regressive step considering concerns of Japanese 
citizens and the commitment to energy conversion. However, this trend cannot 
be blamed on electric power companies alone, which cannot but prioritize cost 
efficiency in what is now a fiercely competitive energy market. It would thus not 
be an exaggeration to say that Japan’s current situation provides a good example 
of how market liberalization does not necessarily lead to environmentally 
friendly and safe energy.
This point alludes to the important issue of how societies should think about 
electricity. Regarding electricity as a commodity, Japan has already embarked on 
a path of liberalization. However, electricity is quite different from other 
consumer goods. This uniqueness is all the more pronounced in comparing 
electricity with gas. Electricity can be produced using gas, but social infrastructure 
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and products that rely on electricity cannot rely on gas alone. Ultimately, not 
only does electricity underlie national security and the national economy in a 
way that other energy sources do not, it also has a direct connection to the 
safety and livelihood of the people. Therefore, there is room for contemplation 
regarding whether it is wise to treat electricity as just another commodity, as 
attested to by the discussion of the Japanese case in this paper. Of course, neither 
is it a good idea for society to regress into moral laxity and inefficiently waste 
electricity by considering it anything but a public good. One of the important 
lessons of the Japanese case, then, pertains to the need to establish a proper 
understanding of electricity as a basis for energy policy.
The second problem worth considering is the importance of nuclear power 
generation to energy security and thus the difficulty of abandoning it. In the 
case of Korea, the Moon Jae-in administration resolved to “permanently shut 
down” Kori-1, Korea’s oldest nuclear reactor, at a meeting of the Nuclear Safety 
and Security Commission on June 9, 2017, just one month after Moon came to 
power. The administration also ordered the temporary halt to the construction 
of Shin Kori-5 and Shin Kori-6, initiating a public debate committee to 
determine whether construction should continue that deliberated the issue from 
July 24 to October 24.21 Finally, it was decided that Wŏlsŏng-122 be closed in 
June 2018, prior to the scheduled expiration of its operations (“Early Closure,” 
2018).
However, as revealed in the frustration of the DPJ administration’s post-
Fukushima nuclear policy and the Abe administration’s subsequent revival of 
pre-Fukushima nuclear policy, in countries such as Japan—endowed with few 
natural resources, denied connection to a multi-national wide-area power grid, 
and striving to secure a stable base load—the role of nuclear power with respect 
to energy security is substantial. Therefore, no matter the disparity with public 
opinion, in such circumstances it is not easy to give up nuclear power. Moreover, 
nuclear power generation’s major contribution under the new climate change 
regime cannot but be considered quite appealing. This point suggests the 
possibility of the continued expansion of the nuclear power industry in 
21. The Shin Kori-5 and 6 public debate committee recommended to the government resumption 
of construction on October 20. The Blue House responded, “We shall respect the recommendation 
of the public debate committee, which undertook careful deliberation for three months” (Yi 
Chŏng-ae 2017). This has been a subject of controversy, with some criticizing the enormous social 
cost and some praising the experiment in deliberative democracy. Meanwhile, others criticize 
Moon for breaking his election promise to shut down the reactors.  
22. This was Korea’s second nuclear reactor after Kori-1. It was a pressurized heavy water reactor 
imported from Canada (CANDU). Construction began in 1977 and was completed in 1983.
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developing and emerging economies into the future.
However, there is a need to recognize that spent fuel and waste will remain 
problematic for nuclear power generation. Currently, Sweden and Finland are 
the only two nations serving as final repositories for spent fuel. Japan is also 
confronting contradictions due to the problem of nuclear fuel disposal and a 
lagging fuel cycle policy, as discussed in this paper. Emerging economies 
endeavoring to increase their use of nuclear power generation need to consider 
the risks, encumbrances, and social costs entailed. These can be revealed in the 
precedents set by advanced economies like Japan.
• Translated by Keiran MACRAE
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